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Abstract
This article explores the link between the financial crisis and Euroscepticism at the level of public
opinion, building on and developing further the literature on the impact of economic, identity and
institutional factors on Euroscepticism. It argues that the economic crisis did not substantially bring
economic factors back in as an important source of Euroscepticism, even though the most pro-
nounced increase in Euroscepticism has taken place in the countries most affected by the crisis. By
contrast, national identity and political institutions play an increasingly important role in explain-
ing public Euroscepticism.
Introduction
The global financial crisis delivered a major shock to the European economy: falling
growth rates, rising unemployment, soaring public deficits and debts.1 The crisis also had
far-reaching social and political impacts – most notably the resignation of governments in
office in some of the European countries most heavily hit by the crisis, such as Greece.
This article asks whether there is a link between the financial crisis and Euroscepticism at
the level of public opinion. In so doing, it revisits and updates the literature on the impact
of economic, identity and institutional factors on Euroscepticism.
The article is organized as follows. Section I reviews the literature on the definitions and
causes of Euroscepticism. Section II outlines the research design, including the hypotheses
to be tested against the empirical data and the measurement of key variables. Section III
reports the main findings of the statistical analysis. It is argued that, contrary to what could
have been expected, the economic crisis did not substantially bring economic factors back
in as an important source of Euroscepticism. By contrast, the crisis seems to have enhanced
the role of public confidence in national political institutions, and that of national identity,
in accounting for Eurosceptic tendencies at the level of public opinion.
I. The State of the Art
The study of public opinion with regard to European integration has been a growing
field of empirical research since the 1970s, drawing on the tools and methods of the
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1 In Ireland, Spain and Greece, the annual growth rate dropped, respectively, from 5, 3.9 and 3.7 in the period 2005–06 to
a negative growth rate of -1.2, -3.1 and -4.8 in the period 2009–10. Spain and Ireland moved from a small budget surplus
in the period 2005–06 to a budget deficit of -6.6 and -13.8 in the period 2008–09. In 2010, Italy and Greece had a
debt-to-GDP ratio of 109 and 148, respectively (New York Times, 10 June 2011).
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comparative study of regime support at the national level (Loveless and Rohrschneider,
2011, p. 5). The concept of ‘Euroscepticism’, originally crafted to analyze the positions of
political parties towards European integration (Taggart, 1998), was imported to this field
of study in the last decade (Krouwel and Abts, 2007; Wessels, 2007; Leconte, 2010) and
is now commonly used to refer to a subset of negative attitudes towards the European
Union (EU) and/or European integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2010).
In contrast to earlier work on EU support which did not always clearly specify the
object of the mass attitudes involved or their type, recent scholarship on public Euro-
scepticism distinguishes between ‘authorities, regime and community’ and ‘diffuse’ as
well as ‘specific’ modes of opposition, adopting Easton’s framework of regime support
(Krouwel and Abts, 2007; Wessels, 2007; Boomgaarden et al., 2010). ‘Opposition to the
authorities’ refers to negative attitudes towards public officials and institutional actors
that exercise EU governance. ‘Opposition to the regime’ refers to negative attitudes
towards the political values, norms and structures of the EU. ‘Opposition to the com-
munity’ refers to negative attitudes towards other citizens understood as fellow members
of the European collective (Wessels, 2007, p. 289). ‘Diffuse opposition’ is opposition
towards the idea of European integration, while ‘specific opposition’ is opposition
towards the EU as the current embodiment of that idea (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002,
p. 300).
At the root of all discussions of the objects and modes of public Euroscepticism lies a
distinction between mass attitudes towards the current workings of the EU and mass
attitudes towards the project of European integration. McLaren (2006, p. 21) argues that
the two are conceptually distinct but empirically closely connected; she expects that at the
mass level, negative attitudes towards the EU partly reflect negative attitudes towards
integration efforts. As Loveless and Rohrschneider (2011, p. 5) posit: ‘[I]f Europeans
believe that EU institutions fail adequately to represent their interests and are no longer
transparent, this undermines the core of the EU’s raison d’être, certainly in the long run’.
Wessels (2007, p. 290) makes a similar point when he argues that public Euroscepticism
is cumulative. He argues that scepticism that is specific and directed towards ‘authorities’
and ‘regime’ will accumulate and develop into diffuse scepticism directed towards ‘com-
munity’. What emerges from these discussions is that public Euroscepticism directed
against the ‘regime’ is the most deleterious and perhaps most significant to monitor
because in the long run it undermines support for the general project of European
integration.
Much of the recent literature on public Euroscepticism also makes a welcome attempt
to specify the range of negative attitudes that fall under the label of ‘Euroscepticism’ (see
Vasilopoulou in this issue). Scholars do so by drawing a line between critics and sceptics
(Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008), although not all will draw the line at the same point.
Krouwel and Abts (2007, p. 263), for instance, classify attitudes towards Europe to range
between trust, scepticism, distrust and cynicism, and alienation (reflecting degrees of
reflexivity), arguing that only the cynics and the alienated oppose the EU and the Euro-
pean project more broadly, whereas the sceptics and the distrustful are simply critically
disposed towards both. Wessels’ (2007) distinction between critical Europeans, Euro-
sceptics and adamant Eurosceptics (reflecting degrees of identification with the EU)
incorporates a different palette of attitudes under the Eurosceptic banner. For Wessels
(2007, p. 300), critics are likely to demand a better or a different Europe, while sceptics
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(adamant or not) will not wish to see the EU survive altogether. The conceptualization and
measurement of public Euroscepticism should therefore be sensitive to the fact that
scepticism towards the EU and/or European integration is represented in a more narrow
set of attitudes which takes opposition one step beyond criticism.
As for the causes of Euroscepticism, after the ‘permissive consensus’ (Inglehart, 1970)
of the early decades of European integration, several explanations have been put forward
in the literature to account for the support (or the lack thereof) for it. In the period up to
the early 1990s, the literature mostly focused on national economic performance, as
indicated by measures such as growth rate, inflation and unemployment (Anderson and
Kaltenthaler, 1996), country net benefits from EU membership (Eichenberg and Dalton,
1993; Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Carrubba, 1997) and subjective ‘economic percep-
tions’ (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993), in order to explain public attitudes towards the EU.
This was referred to as the ‘sociotropic economic explanation’.2
Subsequently, this explanation was challenged by works that adopted ‘egocentric
utilitarianism’ by looking at the impact of subjective individual-level indicators on public
support for the EU (Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Whitten, 1997). These works considered
individuals’ cost–benefit analysis, combining socio-economic perceptions with social
variables (Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2011). The logic informing this explanation was
that the socio-economic location of individuals, such as economic positions, education or
occupation, affect whether individuals are winners or losers from the process of European
integration (Gabel, 1998). As can be expected, the winners (the most well off, educated,
skilled individuals) are much more likely to support integration than the losers (Gabel and
Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998).
Public support for European integration dropped in the 1990s, despite some favourable
economic conditions such as low inflation rates in Europe. The Treaty on European Union
(TEU) (also known as the ‘Maastricht Treaty’) transformed the nature of the EU from a
primarily economic project into a political one. The ‘deepening’ of the EU, resulting from
the new competences acquired by the EU following the TEU (first and foremost, the
project of economic and monetary union [EMU]) was combined with the ‘widening’ of
the EU through enlargement to central and eastern European countries. These watershed
events changed the public’s cost–benefit calculations, bringing social and political vari-
ables, such as identity and political institutions, to the forefront in explaining public
opinion support (or otherwise) for the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; Loveless and
Rohrschneider, 2011).
Consequently, some research has focused on ‘national identity’ in order to explain
public support for the EU, reaching somewhat different conclusions. Carey (2002) and
McLaren (2002) argue that a strong national identity is an obstacle to European integra-
tion as it is likely to foster Eurosceptic attitudes. By contrast, for Duchesne and Frognier
(1995), Bruter (2005) and Citrin and Sides (2004) a strong national identity is fully
compatible with pro-European attitudes. Hooghe and Marks (2005) stress the impact of
‘exclusive national identity’ on the negative perception of Europe. According to exclusive
national identity, citizens feel attachment only to their nation and not to Europe. By
contrast, ‘cumulative national identity’ means that citizens see themselves as European
and national at the same time. Sanders et al. (2012; see also Serricchio, 2011, for the
2 For an excellent review of the literature on the causes of Euroscepticism, see Loveless and Rohrschneider (2011).
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Italian case) stress the different role of various components of national identity. The
achieved (or civic) component of identity promotes pro-European attitudes, while the
ascribed (or ethnic) component is positively correlated with Euroscepticism.
Other research has argued that trust (or its lack) in ‘domestic political institutions’
shapes public attitudes towards the EU. According to Anderson (1998), trust in domestic
political institutions positively influences attitudes towards the EU. Hence a mechanism of
institutional proxy is at work: national institutions provide citizens with a cognitive short
cut towards trust in EU institutions (Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2011). By contrast,
Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) argues that low levels of trust in national political institutions
result in stronger public support for the EU. Hence a mechanism of substitution is at
work: EU institutions are substitutes for ineffective/weak domestic political institutions
(see also Sanders et al., 2012). Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010) model country
characteristics in order to understand mass attitudes towards the EU.
Finally, some research has looked at the importance of ‘political ideologies’, arguing
that supporters of centrist parties are less likely to be Eurosceptic, whereas supporters of
extreme left-wing or right-wing parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic (Steenbergen
et al., 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010). As Taggart (1998) puts it in the title of his
seminal article, Euroscepticism is a ‘touchstone of dissent’.
II. The Research Design
The most common measure of public Euroscepticism has been negative attitudes towards
one’s country’s membership of the EU (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Kuhn, 2012). Other
common measures have relied on data regarding the desired speed of integration (Garry
and Tilley, 2009), feelings towards the prospect of EU disintegration (Wessels, 2007) and
other variations which record negative attitudes towards the general project of European
unification. Data for attitudes towards membership have been steadily available in the
Eurobarometer poll since the 1970s, which is not the case for the measurement of general
attitudes towards European integration.
Several doubts can be expressed about the reliability of negative attitudes towards
membership as an indicator of public Euroscepticism. One objection has been that levels
of knowledge about the EU have historically been low (see Guerra in this issue); therefore
the answers to the membership question do not reflect a balanced or accurate judgement
on behalf of citizens. Also, the volatility of these attitudes has been greater than that
associated with attitudes towards unification (Leconte, 2010, p. 165). While acknowledg-
ing those potential limitations, in this study we will use the membership indicator to
measure the dependent variable.
One major advantage of this measure is that it mainly reflects public opposition to the
EU as a ‘regime’ (Niedermayer and Westle, 1995). As argued in the previous section,
opposition to the regime is a key aspect of mass Euroscepticism since it undermines
support for the overall project of European integration in the long run. Furthermore,
citizens’ negative view of their country’s EU membership can be taken to reflect scepti-
cism, rather than criticism, of the EU. We assume that critics would want their country to
stay in an improved EU or would want to suspend judgement until the EU is reformed in
the ‘right’ direction, while sceptics would rather see their country withdraw from mem-
bership altogether.
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In line with much of the relevant literature, we therefore measure Euroscepticism
by using the ‘membership’ question, which has appeared in the Eurobarometer survey
regularly since the 1970s:
Q1: Generally speaking do you think (our country’s) membership is: a good thing; a bad
thing; neither good nor bad; do not know; refusal?
We recoded this variable into a binary in which 0 indicates membership is neutral or a
good thing and 1 indicates membership is a bad thing. ‘Do not know’ and ‘refusal’ are
recoded as missing and excluded from the analysis.
The independent variables are derived from the literature on Euroscepticism reviewed
in the previous section. The description and measurement of the variables is reported in
Table 1. They can be grouped into four main paradigms:
Table 1: Description of the Variables
Description Source
Dependent variable
Euroscepticism Binary variable membership indicator recoded as: Eurobarometer
0 membership is neutral or good thing; 1 membership is a bad thing 67.2, 2007; 75.3,
2010
Independent variables
Economic expectations 1–3 scale. This is an index based on the combination of national
economic and financial expectation (1 pessimistic; 2 neutral; 3
optimistic)
Eurobarometer
67.2, 2007; 75.3,
2010
Exclusive national identity Exclusive national identity is based on a combination of two
attachment scales (national and European attachment) in 2007;
exclusive national identity in 2010 (Moreno question recoded as 0
European and other; 1 national identity)
Eurobarometer
67.2, 2007; 75.3,
2010
Political ideology Left–right scale recoded as: 0 left and right; 1 centrism Eurobarometer
67.2, 2007; 75.3,
2010
National institutional
confidence
An index with level of confidence in parliament and government
(national): 1 tend to not trust; 2 tend to trust
Eurobarometer
67.2, 2007; 75.3,
2010
European institutional
confidence
An index with level of confidence in parliament and Commission
(European): 1 tend to not trust; 2 tend to trust
Eurobarometer
67.2, 2007; 75.3,
2010
Professional occupation:
manual
Binary variable: 0 other; 1 manual occupation
Professional occupation:
manager
Binary variable: 0 other; 1 manager
Education Age education recoded as: 1 no full-time education; 2 still studying;
3 15+ years; 4 16–19 years; 5 20+ years
Aggregate variables
Level of corruption Corruption perception index: 0 high corruption; 10 low corruption Transparency
International
GDP growth Differences in % to previous year Eurostat
Unemployment rate Annual unemployment rate Eurostat
Annual inflation rate Annual inflation rate Eurostat
Source: Provided in the right-hand column of the table.
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1. Instrumental/economic explanation
– sociotropic: economic expectations
– egocentric: occupation (manual and manager)
2. Affective identitarian explanation
– exclusive national identity
3. Political–institutional explanation
– national institutional confidence
– European institutional confidence
4. Political–ideological explanation
– location along the political spectrum, in particular centrist versus extreme right- and
left-wing positions
As for the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, on the basis of
the literature review the following hypotheses can be put forward:
• The more positive the evaluation of the economy, the lower the level of Euroscepticism
(H1).
• The higher the socio-economic status, the lower the level of Euroscepticism (H2).
• The higher the trust in EU institutions, the lower the level of Euroscepticism (H3).
• The higher the exclusive national identity, the higher the level of Euroscepticism (H4).
• The role of trust in national institutions is not clear in the literature: a high trust in
national political institutions can strengthen or weaken the level of Euroscepticism.
• Finally, positions towards either extreme of the political spectrum will be associated
with higher levels of Euroscepticism.
We included control variables at the individual level (age, sex, education) and aggregate
level (gross domestic product [GDP] growth, annual inflation rate, unemployment rate and
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)). The time frame of the research covers the period
from the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 until 2011. We use Eurobarometer data for
this period.3
III. Data Analysis
The analysis of the dependent variable – namely support for EU membership – shows that
there has been a steady increase in Euroscepticism from the onset of the crisis in 2007 (see
Figure 1). This increase is more pronounced in the eurozone countries (5.6 per cent)
compared to the non-eurozone countries (3.3 per cent), which is to be expected given the
fact that the impact of the economic crisis exposed the structural weaknesses of EMU.
Interestingly, the rise in Euroscepticism is, on average, more pronounced for the Member
States that joined the Union after 2004 (5.75 per cent) compared to ‘old’ Member States
(4 per cent). This trend indicates that the crisis may have reversed the ‘accession effect’,
according to which new Member States become less Eurosceptic as they become inte-
grated into EU norms and practices (Evans and Butt, 2007; Verney, 2011, p. 6).
If we look at Eurosceptic trends in a long-term perspective – that is, from the signing
of the TEU (1992) onward – Euroscepticism peaked between 1995 and 1997 and was
3 The strategy is to compare identical models in different years. So, in the multivariate analysis we focus on 2007 and 2010
(and not 2011) because of the availability of the same indicators in the two data sets.
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subsequently reduced on the run-up to the final stage of EMU in late 1998. After the global
financial crisis, Euroscepticism reached (and later surpassed) the 1995–97 level, exceed-
ing 18 per cent in 2011. Hence, in historical perspective, the increased level of Euroscep-
ticism following the financial crisis is significant.
If we look at the upward trend in Euroscepticism between 2007 and 2011, we observe
considerable variation across countries (Figure 2). We can distinguish between three
groups of countries according to the degree of change in Euroscepticism levels involved.
The most pronounced upward increase in Euroscepticism has taken place in Greece (23
per cent), Portugal (13 per cent) and Slovenia (12 per cent), followed by Lithuania (9 per
cent), Spain (9 per cent), Cyprus (8 per cent) and Ireland (7 per cent). A second group of
countries (BE, BG, CZ, ES, DK, DE, HU, IT, LV, LU, MT, NL, PL, RO, SK), which is the
largest of the three groups, has experienced a moderate increase in Euroscepticism
ranging from 6 per cent to 1 per cent. At the other end of the continuum, Euroscepticism
has remained constant and even decreased in a third group of countries comprising,
notably, Austria (0 per cent), the United Kingdom (0 per cent), France (-1 per cent),
Finland (-3 per cent) and Sweden (-6 per cent).
Most countries in the third group, as well as a few of the countries in the second
group, have consistently nourished high levels of public Euroscepticism (McLaren, 2006,
pp. 23, 160; Leconte, 2010, p. 70), particularly after 1992. On the contrary, Greece,
Portugal, Ireland and Spain (except in the mid-1990s) experienced low levels of public
Figure 1: The Evolution of Euroscepticism since the TEU
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Source: Eurobarometer.
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Euroscepticism throughout the 1990s and most of the 2000s (Llamazares and Gramacho,
2005; Verney, 2011) with regard to the EU average. Clearly, the countries where public
Euroscepticism has registered the most pronounced increase are those that have been
most hard-hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010–11. After the outbreak of the crisis,
public Euroscepticism in these countries has risen to levels that match or exceed the EU
average and are traditionally observed in countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Having established that there was a considerable change in levels of public Euroscep-
ticism during the time of the global financial crisis, the question that we address in the rest
of this section is which factors are likely to have been most significant in explaining that
change. Since the countries that have demonstrated the most significant rise in Euroscep-
ticism are those that have been hardest hit by the crisis, we would expect economic factors,
particularly those pertaining to the sociotropic explanation, to yield enhanced explanatory
power. We would thus expect to find that the post-1992 trend, which is characterized by
the rising importance of political factors such as identity and trust in national institutions,
would be reversed with economic factors coming back as most significant.
Going back to our first hypothesis, we test if there is a correlation between Euroscep-
ticism, on the one hand, and the perception of the national economy (as it is now) as well
as the expectations concerning the national economy (as it is expected to be in the future),
on the other hand. Figure 3 suggests that this relationship is not systematic for each
Figure 2: Euroscepticism across Countries, 2007 and 2011
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country. Euroscepticism is strongly related to a negative evaluation of the economy only
in some countries: those located in the top-right corner of the figure. Notably, they are:
Greece, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. This evidence drives us
toward a more comprehensive analysis of the link between increasing Euroscepticism and
economic crisis. Do factors other than the performance of the national economy have a
greater explanatory power for Euroscepticism?
The test is conducted via a multivariate analysis, building up a regression model in
which all predictors are included.4 Our model fits reasonably well, both in 2007 and 2010,
as the levels of the pseudo R2 indicator reveal (0.20 in both years). Single observable
predictors, such as economic expectations (which is a way to operationalize the sociotro-
pic explanation) and occupational status (which is a way to operationalize egocentric
utilitarianism), have limited explanatory power. Objective economic indicators, such as
4 Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, we employ a logistic regression technique. The models include, among
predictors, both individual- and aggregate-level variables. The standard error is corrected for cluster (group/country) using
Stata. Similar results could be reached with a ‘classic’ multi-level model, using other software (for example, HLM).
Figure 3: Country Location in a Space Defined by Perception on National Economy and Negative
View on Europe, 2011
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GDP and level of unemployment, have very limited explanatory power only for 2007 and
not for 2010. In sum, economic indicators, both individual and aggregate, seem not to be
directly involved in fostering Euroscepticism. On the contrary, exclusive national identity
in 2007 and 2010 is positively (and highly) correlated with Euroscepticism, and this
variable actually increases its explanatory power between 2007 and 2010 (see Table 2).
The multivariate model analysis in Table 2 highlights a (negative) impact of national
institutional confidence on Euroscepticism: this means that peoples who have more
confidence in their national political system are also less Eurosceptic. This happens
regardless of the level of corruption across countries (the CPI indicator), which can be
seen as a systematic way of measuring the quality of domestic political institutions. In
other words, our findings confirm that national institutions are a sort of proxy for Euro-
peanism rather than a substitute, as argued by Anderson (1998). National governments
and parliaments are directly involved in dealing with the financial crisis and citizens ask
them for (efficient) solutions to economic problems.
It is noteworthy that this variable almost halves its explanatory power from 2007 to
2010. By contrast, confidence in European institutions slightly increased its explanatory
power between 2007 and 2010. How can we make sense of these trends? We can postulate
that a ‘trade-off’ effect was at work during the evolution of the financial crisis over time.
In the first phase of the financial crisis, the so-called ‘banking crisis’, the main response
came from national institutions. Indeed, the bail-out of specific banks (such as Northern
Rock in the United Kingdom and IKB in Germany) in 2007 and the full-fledged banking
Table 2: The Predictors of Euroscepticism: Logistic Regression Model with Standard Error
Corrected by Cluster (Country)
2007 2010
Instrumental/economic paradigm
Economic expectations -0.16** (0.08) -0.16*** (0.07)
Occupation: manual 0.12 (0.12) -0.01 (0.07)
Occupation: manager -0.21** (0.09) -0.44*** (0.09)
Affective/identitarian paradigm
National identity 0.77*** (0.13) 0.87*** (0.10)
Political ideology paradigm
Centrism 0.04 (0.10) -0.16** (0.07)
Political institutional paradigm
National institutional confidence -0.77*** (0.19) -0.39*** (0.11)
European institutional confidence -1.4*** (0.10) -1.67*** (0.11)
Sociodemographic variables
Education -0.15*** (0.03) -0.13*** (0.03)
Aggregate control variables
Level of corruption 0.08 (0.06) 0.15** (0.07)
GDP growth -0.13*** (0.05) -0.01 (0.08)
Unemployment rate -0.13 (0.09) -0.03 (0.02)
Annual inflation rate -0.05 (0.05) 0.07 (0.08)
Constant 1.03 (1.05) -0.25 (0.78)
Pseudo R2 0.20*** 0.20***
Number of observations 17,310 17,939
Source: Eurobarometer 75.3 (2011).
Notes: Dependent variable: EU membership is a bad thing. Sex and age are not shown. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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rescue plans in the autumn of 2008 were articulated and executed by the national
authorities. The Member States were the main players in this policy area, even though
they co-ordinated their actions at the EU level. They did this, for example, through
EU-concerted action plans (Quaglia et al., 2009). Citizens looked for solutions to the
financial problems at the national level. Hence, a high level of confidence in national
institutions resulted in a low level of Euroscepticism.
In the second stage of the financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, the EU played a
more important role. Indeed, new EU institutions, such as the European Stabilization Fund,
later the European Stability Mechanism, were created in 2010 and 2011. At this stage,
confidence in national institutions became less important in explaining Euroscepticism. By
contrast, confidence in EU institutions has greater explanatory power for Euroscepticism.
The halving of the explanatory power of the variable confidence in national institutions
is not entirely compensated for by the (limited) increase of the explanatory power of
confidence in European institutions. Nonetheless, the evolution of the explanatory power
of these two institutional variables seems to support this interpretation.
This analysis suggests that Euroscepticism is rooted in national contexts; this corrobo-
rates the findings of previous research (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Bellucci et al., 2012).
The economic crisis does not challenge this trend. The role of national institutional
confidence still changes across countries (Table 3), but there are not uniform patterns. The
examination of the sign and the magnitude of the relationship between national institu-
tional confidence and Euroscepticism in different countries confirm what we found in our
pooled regression model: in general, national institutional confidence is less important in
2010 than in 2007. In 2010, it is statically significant only in five countries (Austria,
Finland, Germany, Italy and Slovenia) and, in general, the magnitude of association is less
strong in 2010. There are also few changes in the direction of the relationship: this
happens only in some eastern European countries that recently joined the EU, such as
Hungary, Poland and Romania, and, among the old Member States (Italy).
Conclusions
This work has explored the link between the global financial crisis and Euroscepticism. In
particular, it asked whether the crisis has caused an increase in Euroscepticism, and what
causal mechanisms have been at play. We have tested the explanatory power of the
mainstream paradigms in the literature, concluding that the economic explanation has
very limited analytical leverage. The crisis has not brought economics back in as the most
important source of Euroscepticism during the turbulent period of 2007–10. Rather, it has
not only confirmed, but indeed exacerbated, the post-1992 trends, according to which
national identity and political institutions play an increasingly important role in explaining
public Euroscepticism.
Exclusive national identity is positively correlated to Euroscepticism and increases its
explanatory power between 2007 and 2010. Confidence in national political institutions is
negatively correlated to Euroscepticism. However, this variable halves its explanatory
power from 2007 to 2010. By contrast, confidence in European institutions slightly
increases its explanatory power between 2007 and 2010. Why has this happened? It is
possible to argue that a trade-off effect between confidence in national institutions and
confidence in EU institutions was at work during the unfolding of the crisis. During the
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first stage of the crisis, the banking crisis, citizens mainly looked for solutions to financial
problems at the national level. Indeed, national institutions were the most involved in
banking rescue plans and the like. Hence, confidence in national institutions was impor-
tant in explaining Euroscepticism. In the second stage of the crisis, the sovereign debt
crisis, EU institutions became more involved in dealing with the crisis and new institutions
were created for that purpose. Confidence in EU institutions then became (slightly) more
important than in the past in order to account for Eurosceptic tendencies.
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Table 3: The Impact of National Institutional Confidence on
Euroscepticism
2007 2010
Austria -0.49** -0.72**
Belgium -0.81** -0.53
Bulgaria 0.41 0.34
Czech Republic -0.88** -0.38
Cyprus 0.29 0.28
Denmark -0.49** -0.30
Estonia -1.6** -0.14
Finland -0.95*** -0.65**
France -0.62** -0.48*
Germany -0.77** -0.85***
Greece -1.07** -0.34
Hungary -1.3*** 0.06
Ireland -1.5** -0.18
Italy 0.20 -0.81*
Latvia -1.3** -0.30
Lithuania -0.89* -0.12
Luxembourg -1.15 -0.00
Malta -2.8*** -0.94
Netherlands -0.75** -0.06
Poland -1.26* 0.45
Portugal -0.47 -0.49
Romania 0.82* -0.28
Slovakia -0.39 -0.39
Slovenia -0.70* -0.99*
Spain -0.37 -0.35
Sweden -0.83*** -0.01
United Kingdom -1.46*** -0.12
Source: Eurobarometer 75.3 (2011).
Notes: Entries are unstandardized coefficients derived from country-by-country
logistic regression model as used in Table 2. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
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